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Abstract 
It has been widely documented that fiscal policy can promote economic growth, when it is based 
on an efficient provision of pubic capital. But little work has been done, in Bolivia, in relation to the 
macroeconomic and sectoral impacts of increasing public investment in infrastructure. This paper 
develops a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model for a small open economy with 
five sectors: Non-tradable or services, importable or manufacturing, hydrocarbons, mining and 
agriculture.  The  model  is  parameterized  and  solved  for  the  Bolivian  economy  and  several 
interesting  scenarios  are  simulated  by  changing  government  expenditures,  taxes,  country  risk, 
Total  Factor  Productivity,  effectiveness  of  public  capital  and  terms  of  trade.  This  analysis  is 
relevant for the Bolivian economy, because the government is using fiscal policy as one of its main 
tool to attack poverty and aims to put public investment as the foremost instruments to promote 
growth and welfare.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Although infrastructure was incorporated into the theory of growth literature by Arrow & Kurzs 
(1970) and Weitzman (1970), people only began to study the topic seriously after the seminal 
work of Barro (1990). Barro's model is well known because he introduces government spending as 
a variable in the production function. The existence of constant returns to capital and government 
spending imply that the economy is capable of endogenous growth. 
Coinciding with this rebirth of the growth literature, there is also the appearance of an empirical 
literature  related  to  infrastructure.  Infrastructure  becomes  an  important  source  of  growth  as 
shown  by  Aschauer  (1989a,  1989b).  These  works  concentrated  on  the  estimation  of  the 
production elasticities of government expenditure, using aggregated data for countries, mainly the 
U.S.
1 There are also cross-country studies that emphasize the role of infrastructure for a country's 
growth.
2 
Papers in this literature have typically used regression analysis on either "growth accounting " or 
steady state equations. While these papers have been useful in pointing out the importance of 
infrastructure, their methodology does not allow for the analysis of important general equilibrium 
feedback effects among key macroeconomic variables and welfare. 
In this sense, this paper examines the impact of  fiscal policy on output, consumption, private 
investment and foreign trade, using a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model for a 
small open economy with five sectors and with the new feature that firms in each sector employ 
public capital or infrastructure as a factor of production. These sectors which are the non-tradable 
sector (services), the importable sector (manufacturing), hydrocarbons, mining and agriculture are 
representative of the Bolivian economy. In particular the hydrocarbons sector, which is intensive 
in capital,  is conceived  by the government  as  a  strategic  sector that will generate  resources 
necessary to attack poverty and underdevelopment. 
Therefore, the main objectives of the paper are: First to analyze the macroeconomic impact of a 
change in government expenditures, tax structure and  public  investment in  infrastructure on 
output,  consumption, private investment,  trade balance and  welfare, i.e. the macroeconomic 
impacts  of fiscal policy. Second, we aim to analyze the macroeconomic impact of changes in 
relative prices, productivity (TFP), effectiveness of public infrastructure, country risk and public 
consumption valuation. In addition, in both cases we are interested in computing also the sectoral 
impact  of  these  simulations  and  the  social  impact  measured  through  the  transfers  that  the 
government gives to the households.  
                                                             
1
  Munnell  (1990)  and  García-Milá,  McGuire  and  Porter  (1993)  use  Panel  Data  to  estimate  production 
elasticities. 
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 See Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Ford and Poret (1991), Hulten (1996) and Canning (1998) among others.  -3- 
 
We  aim  to  capture  also  important  dynamics  involving  public  expenditure  as  well  as  public 
investment policies combined with expansions in TFP and in the effectiveness of public capital. The 
transitional dynamics are also analyzed for situations in which the government intends to maintain 
its transfer programs unaltered. In the last years, the Bolivian government has based its policy to 
attack poverty on transfers to households through bonuses, therefore it is important to analyze 
under which conditions this policy can be sustainable over time.  
The  DSGE  model  is  based  on  Chumacero,  Fuentes,  &  Schmidt-Hebbel  (2004)  but  modified  to 
include public investment in infrastructure in a way similar to Rioja (2003) and sector division for 
the exportable sector as in Estrada (2006). We calibrated the model for the Bolivian economy and 
solved it using the second-order-approximation technique developed by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 
(2004). The advantage in using this perturbation method is that it allows considering second-order 
effects, which arise as important features in an economy with high levels of uncertainty. 
An  important  aspect  is  that  the  model  allows  us  to  extract  precise  quantitative  implications, 
because we examine the effects of a range of different scenarios on real output and welfare, as 
well as on other macroeconomic variables like consumption, investment and on output of the 
different five sectors. Model simulation results are reported first, for steady-state effects and then 
for the dynamic effects on the composition of these variables. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes fiscal policy in Bolivia. Section 3 
describes the dynamic general equilibrium model and its calibration for the Bolivian economy. 
Then in section 4 we present the simulation results for steady-state effects as well for the dynamic 
effects on selected macroeconomic and sectoral variables. Section 5 concludes. 
2. FISCAL POLICY IN BOLIVIA 
Since  2006  the  Bolivian  economy  has  recorded  a  fiscal  surplus,  explained  mainly  by  the 
international economic boom, translated into high export prices of the products that the country 
exports, more revenues from the Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons and royalties which increased public 
sector revenues in an important manner. Between 2004 and 2008 the government income has 
increased by almost 20 percentage points of GDP.
3 
The following figure shows how these events affected the path of the fiscal deficit as a percentage 
of GDP and its close relationship with the rate of growth of the economy. Since 2002 the trend of 
the fiscal deficit  was decreasing until turning into a surplus  in 2006. The fiscal surplus was 4.5 
percent of GDP, the highest in recent years, and the fiscal balance remained positive until 2009 
inclusive. 
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 For comparison, the fiscal revenues of the U.S. federal government increased by 18.7 percent of GDP in the 
last 40 years (U.S. Congressional Budget Office, 2009). -4- 
 
Figure 1: Fiscal Surplus and Economic Growth (in percentages) 
Source: Central Bank of Bolivia 
The  growth  rate  of  the  economy  has  been  steadily  growing  since  2002  and  it  is  positively 
correlated with the public sector fiscal results. In the period 2004 - 2008 the average growth rate 
of the economy was 4.8 percent and in 2008 it was 6.1 percent, the highest rate of growth since 
1975. In that sense, the economy experienced an unprecedented scenario mainly driven by the 
hydrocarbons sector, mining and construction. On the other hand, government expenditures grew 
significantly in the last years, but much less than incomes. Total incomes increased from 31.6 
percent of GDP in 2005 to 48.4 percent of GDP in 2008, while total expenditures increased from 
33.9 percent of GDP to 45.1 percent of GDP in the same period. Tax revenues increased also by 17 
percent (average between 2004 and 2009). The principal taxes are the Value Added Tax (IVA) and 
the Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons (IDH), which together represent 50 percent of total tax revenues 
(see  table  1).  All  of  this  allowed  strengthening  the  country’s  infrastructure  and  stimulating 
economic development by increasing resources for the health and education sectors. The State 
also increased its participation in productive activities. 
In recent years public investment increased from 6.3 percent of GDP in 2005 to 10.5 percent of 
GDP  in  2009.  Around  1.5  percentage  points  of  this  increase  corresponds  to  investment  in 
infrastructure. It seems that infrastructure investment increased in line with the growth of the 
economy, but social investment and in particular in health and education has remained almost 
unchanged. The data show that capital spending in recent years has focused on road infrastructure 
and water resources, however since 2005 investment to support productive activities has again 
increased but not up to the levels reported in 2002. Certainly, investment in infrastructure plays a 
crucial role in any development strategy for Bolivia, since transport costs are very high, about 20 
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Table 1: Tax Revenues, 2004 – 2009 (In Millions of Bolivianos)     
   2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Value Added Tax (IVA)  4,411  5,261  6,405  7,756  9,558  8,859 
Transactions Tax (IT)  1,567  1,704  1,812  2,081  2,560  2,166 
Firm’s Profits Tax (IUE)  1,468  2,081  2,872  3,059  4,502  7,172 
Specific Consumption Tax (ICE)  558  663  782  930  1,113  1,171 
Complementary Regime Value Added Tax 
(RC-IVA) 
193  213  216  217  258  288 
Hydrocarbons Especial Tax (IEHD)  1,147  1,886  2,000  2,383  2,530  1,791 
Financial Transactions Tax (ITF)  314  633  446  324  340  339 
Others  914  317  345  525  695  1,140 
Total Domestic Taxes   10,571  12,757  14,879  17,275  21,556  22,927 
Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons (IDH)  0  2,328  5,497  5,954  6,644  6,465 
Import Tariff (GA)  672  796  921  1,117  1,407  1,179 
Total Domestic Taxes  + IDH + GA  11,243  15,881  21,297  24,346  29,607  30,571 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Public Financing 
 
Figure 2: Public Investment (percentages of GDP) 
 
Source: UDAPE 
Figure 2, shows the evolution of public investment as percentage of GDP. Investment in social 
issues has decreased from 3.3 percent in 2002 to 2.3 percent in 2006, but then it has increased 
again up to 2.8 percent in 2009. Notice that investment in infrastructure has increased the most. 
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Productive Development Bank (BDP for its initials in Spanish) in 2007 is in part reflected in public 
investment.
4 
Figure 4 shows the composition of current income of the nonfinancial public sector. It can be seen 
that tax revenues remain the main source of income, although oil revenues have increased due to 
the boost in international prices. Also in 2007 public companies began to generate incomes due to 
the process of nationalization of the so called strategic companies.
5  
 
Figure 3: Public Investment (percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: Central Bank and Ministry of Economy and Public Financing 
 
Much  of  these  revenues  are  transferred  to  sub  national  governments  (Prefectures,  Municipal 
Governments and public universities) which are the entities that execute the public investment, 
but  mostly  in  social  issues  than  in  road  infrastructure.  The  largest  infrastructure  projects  are 
implemented  by  national  bodies  such  as  the  Ministry  of  Public  Works  or  the  Bolivian  road 
company (Administradora Boliviana de Caminos, ABC). 
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 Since October 2009 the BDP has lent USD 156 million to 15,903 individuals with an average of USD 
10,000 per person. 
5 Here we can mention the nationalization of YPFB –the oil company- in 2006, the nationalization of Entel-
the telecom company- in 2008, the creation of BOA –an aviation company- in 2008 and the reactivation of 









































Figure 4: Composition of Government Current Income (percentage of total) 
 
Source: UDAPE 
As  shown  in  Table  2  the  main  sources  of  financing  public  investment  are  the  Direct  Tax  on 
Hydrocarbons (IDH), royalties and co-participation with municipalities. Between 2004 and 2008 
the government revenues from hydrocarbons raised from USD 53 per capita up to USD 401.1 (in 
constant dollars of 2008). Remark that most of the resources that are currently financing public 
investment are temporary, in particular those resources that come from the high prices of natural 
gas and mining exports. In this framework it is necessary to optimize the executions of public 
investment. 
Table 2: Public Investment Composition by Source of Financing (as percentage of total) 
Source  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Total Public Investment  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Internal Resources  52.9  52.1  46.2  36.4  33.6  37.2  62.4  68.6  68.5 
TGN y TGN-Titles  5.2  6.6  5.0  3.9  3.5  2.4  1.3  2.2  6.4 
Found of Compensation  1.6  1.8  1.4  0.9  1.1  0.5  0.6  0.5  0.7 
Counter Value Resources  3.8  3.0  5.3  2.7  3.0  1.7  1.8  1.6  1.4 
Co participation IEHD  5.2  5.9  3.0  2.7  2.0  2.1  1.8  1.2  2.8 
Direct Tax on 
Hydrocarbons (IDH) 
--  --  --  --  --  1.5  24.4  31.7  21.6 
Co participation 
Municipalities 
17.3  15.2  13.4  13.1  11.0  10.4  9.9  10.7  11.2 
Royalties  3.2  4.3  5.6  6.6  7.3  12.2  19.6  17.0  15.2 
Own Resources  13.3  13.1  10.9  5.5  5.2  5.6  2.6  3.2  8.6 
Other  3.4  2.3  1.5  1.0  0.6  0.7  0.5  0.5  0.7 
External Resources  47.1  47.9  53.8  63.6  66.4  62.8  37.6  31.4  31.5 
Credits  34.8  30.3  33.9  43.4  50.3  49.5  26.1  22.2  22.1 
Donations  12.4  17.6  19.9  20.2  16.1  13.3  11.5  9.2  9.3 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Public Financing 
 
Bolivia’s  poverty  reduction  strategy  is  based  solely  in  the  conditional  transfers  that  the 
government gives to households. The type of transfers has expanded in the last years. There are -8- 
 
currently  three  types  of  transfers:  Renta  Dignidad  (for  persons  over  60  years  of  age),  bono 
Juancito Pinto (for students in primary school) and bono Juana Azurduy (for mothers during and 
after pregnancy)
6. Figure 5 shows the current transfers, with and without pensions.  
Figure 5: Transfers (in Millions of Bolivianos) 
 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Public Financing 
 
In 2008 the number of beneficiaries amounted to 1,681,135 and 687,962 for the Bono Juancito 
Pinto and Renta Dignidad, respectively. The percentage of relevant population covered by these 
conditional transfers programs is 95.9 percent for the first bonus and 101.8 percent for the second 
bonus. This amount is larger than 100 percent because they covered more people than what was 
expected.  These  transfers  are  social  in  nature  and  directly  influence  the  consumption  of 
beneficiary households. By calibrating the general equilibrium model, in the next section, we aim 
to  identify  the  macroeconomic  impact  of  these  policies  as  well  as  the  pressure  on  the  fiscal 
balance. 
Finally, figure 6 shows the domestic and external debt acquired by the government during the last 
seven years (period 2002 – 2009). Notice, that there has been a substitution between foreign and 
domestic debt, with domestic debt becoming more important than foreign debt  in 2006. The 
domestic debt has been increasing steadily from USD 1710 millions in 2002 to USD 5256 millions in 
2008, and only in 2009 do we observe a slight decline. The opposite happened with the external 
debt, although we observe an increase in the last two years. Most of the domestic debt is with the 
so  called  AFP’s  (Pension  Funds  Administrators)  and  with  the  Central  Bank.  However,  the 
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  According  to  Ministry  of  Economy  and  Public  Financing,  the  28  percent  of  Bolivian  population  is 
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government has been able to reduce its debt with the Central Bank, because it has enjoyed fiscal 
surpluses.  
Figure 6: Debt Domestic and External (In Millions of USD) 
 
Source: Central Bank of Bolivia 
3. MODELLING AND CALIBRATION 
3.1 THE BASIC MODEL 
The model is based on Chumacero, Fuentes, & Schmidt-Hebbel (2004) and modified in order to 
address the issue of public investment in infrastructure as in Rioja (2003) and expanded for a 
multisector  economy  as  in  Estrada  (2006).  The  model  is  suitable  to  perform  numerous  and 
interesting simulations related to fiscal policy (increase or decrease of taxes, current spending, and 
public investment), increase in productivity, variation in relative prices of agriculture, mining and 
energy-goods, variation in country-risk, among others, as will become clear from the following 
description. 
3.1.1 The Households 
The economy is inhabited by infinitely-lived individuals who derive utility from consumption of 
importable goods (cm,t), consumption of non-tradable goods (cn,t) and government consumption 
(gt)  which  is  basically  a  public  good  that  does  not  suffer  from  congestion.  Therefore,  a 
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The other goods that are produced in the economy are exportable goods which we denote xh as 
the hydrocarbon good (natural gas), xm as the mineral good (zinc, gold, silver or tin) and xa as the 
agricultural good (soya, Brazilian nuts or quinoa). 
Each household receives interest income rk, lump-sum transfers from the government , profits 
from the importable, non-tradable, mineral and agricultural firms πm, πn, πxm and πxa respectively
7 
and can also contract foreign debt abroad, b. The household's budget constraint is 
t t t n t m t xa t xm t t k
t t t c m t n t n c t m c m
b k r
b r i c p c
        
         
1 , , , ,
, , ,
) )( 1 ( ) 1 (
) ~ 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 (
     
    

    (2) 
where  τm  is  an  import  tariff,  τk  is  the  tax  on  capital  income,  τc  represents  the  tax  rate  on 
consumption of importables and non-tradables, τ is the tax on sectoral profits, pn is the relative 
price on the non-tradable good in terms of the importable good (used as numeraire) and r ~  is the 
(net) interest rate paid on foreign debt. Private investment, which we denote by i, follows the 
standard law of motion for private capital: 
t t t k i k ) 1 ( 1        (3) 
where δ is the depreciation rate of private capital stock and kt is the capital stock.  
Household make choices of cm,t, cn,t, bt+1 and kt+1, i.e the problem of the representative consumer 
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E  (7) 
Equation (5) states that the relative price between importables and non-tradables must equate 
the ratio of marginal utilities between both goods. The next two intertemporal conditions are the 
standard  Euler  equations  that  indicate  that  the  marginal  rate  of  substitution  between 
consumption  today  and  tomorrow,  must  equate  their  relative  price,  evaluated  at  the  cost  of 
foreign borrowing and the rate of return of capital investment, respectively. 
3.1.2 The Firms 
This  economy  is  represented  by  five  sectors  which  are:  importables  (manufacturing),  non-
tradables  (services),  hydrocarbons,  mining  and  agriculture.  In  each  sector  there  is  an  equal 
number of representative firms that require private capital k and public capital kg to produce their 
goods. Firms do not directly own capital, they simply rent kt each period from households at the 
domestic market rental rate of capital rt. Public capital is provided freely by the government. We 
assume that labor is sector specific, which means that labor cannot move across sectors. The 
importable sector is in fact a domestic sector that produces import substitutes.
8 
The firm’s problem is static in this framework  and  sectoral profits are given by the following 
equations: 
t m t t t m mt m t m k r k k z f ,
*
, , ) , , ( ) 1 (         (8) 
t n t t t n nt t n t n k r k k z f p ,
*
, , , ) , , (        (9) 
t xh t t t xh xht t xh t xh k r k k z f q ,
*
, , , ) , , (        (10) 
t xm t t t xm xmt t xm t xm k r k k z f q ,
*
, , , ) , , (       (11) 
t xa t t t xa xat t xa t xa k r k k z f q ,
*
, , , ) , , (        (12) 
where i are the profits of each sector i, zi is a productive shock in sector i, ki is the amount of 
private capital demanded in sector i and qi is the relative price of good i in terms of the importable 
good. Public capital is the same for all sectors. The only difference is the intensity of usage of 
public capital in each sector. 
By maximizing the above profits directly with respect to the relevant capital stock we obtain the 
following first-order conditions: 
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 Imports and import substitutes are perfect substitutes, this means that they should be sold at the same price, 
therefore the domestic price of ym,t is equal to (1+m). -12- 
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, , ,     (16) 
t t t xa t xa xa t xa r k k z f q   ) , , (
*
, , ,     (17) 
These equations describe the demand for capital services by firms of each production sector of the 
economy. 
3.1.3 The Government 
The government invests in infrastructure I, has current expenditure consumption g and provides 
lump-sum transfers to households . The Government has the following budget constraint: 
t xh t t xh t xh
t xa t xm t n t m t t xa t xa t xm t xm t n t n t m m
t t k t m m t t m c m t t n t n t m c t t t
k r y q
k k k k r y q y q y p y
k r y i c i c p c I g
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           
    
    
 (18) 
Notice that in the right hand side of equation (18) we include all the taxes but also the profits from 
the  hydrocarbons  sector.  This  is  in  concordance  with  the  nationalization  of  the  hydrocarbon's 
sector that took place in year 2006. Since then, the hydrocarbon's sector is meant as the strategic 
sector for the Bolivian economy and one of the main sources of incomes of the government. 
Public capital evolves according to 
t g g t t g k I k , 1 , ) 1 (        (19) 
where 0≤kg≤1 is a constant depreciation rate of public capital. 
As in Rioja (2003) we assume that only the effective measure of the stock of public capital kg is 
useful for private production. That is, 
t g t k k ,
*      (20) 
where 0<θ<1 is an infrastructure effectiveness index. The closer θ is to 1, the more effective the 
public capital stock, and the larger the benefit that firms get. 
As usual, the government does not optimize any explicit objective function but instead its current 
expenditure follows the rule: -13- 
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3.1.4 The Foreign Sector 
An open economy has different properties than a closed economy. The main difference is that, if it 
is possible to import goods and capital, the economy having a low initial capital stock would like to 
run a current account deficit in the first periods, sustain a high level of consumption and pay later 
the rest of the world with a current account surplus. This is something that certainly does not 
happen in reality and difficult the solution of the model, because it induces multiple equilibrium 
for each different path of debt, and non-stationarity of the variables.
9  
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) suggest five modifications to the standard small open economy 
model with incomplete asset markets to induce stationarity.  We choose the modification that 
employs a debt-elastic interest-rate premium, which has been used also by Bhandari et. al. (1990), 
Turnovsky (1997), and Osang and Turnovsky (2000).
10     
Therefore  we  assume  that  the  country  faces  an  upward -sloping  supply  schedule  for  debt, 
reflecting the degree of risk associated with lending to the economy. This is expressed by assuming 
that the borrowing rate  1 ~
 t r  , charged on foreign debt is of the form: 
1 ,
*
1 ~ ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ~
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where r
* is the exogenously given world interest rate and  (bt/yt)
 is the country-specific risk 
premium  that  increases  with  the  stock  of  debt  as  a  share  of  output.  Two  elements  are 
fundamental  in  this  specification.  First,  the  convexity  of  the  function  is  a  convenient  way  of 
incorporating the ceiling on borrowing suggested by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). Second, the type 
of AR(1) specification that incorporates uncertainty explains why we need to employ a stochastic 
model.  Otherwise,  by  using  a  non-stochastic  specification  the  model  still  presents  the  failure 
mentioned by Fernandez de Cordoba and Kehoe (2000).  
The relative prices of the exportable goods in terms of the importables, i.e. the terms of trade are 
assumed to have the following law of motion: 
1 , , 1 , ) 1 (       t qxi t xi qxi xi qxi t xi v q q q     ) , 0 ( ~
2
1 , qxi t qxi N v    (23) 
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 See Fernandez de Cordoba and Kehoe (2000) for an application for Spain. 
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 Other modifications imply a model with an endogenous discount factor, with convex portfolio adjustment 
costs, with complete asset markets, and without stationarity-inducing features. -14- 
 
where i=xh, xm and xa. 
3.1.5 Market-Clearing Conditions 
We define the production function of any of the sectors by: 
) , , (
*
, , , t t i t i t i k k z f y    (24) 
where i again represent each of the five sectors. Remark that the public capital k
* is the same for 
all the sectors, which means, for instance, that infrastructure will benefit all the sectors in the 
same manner. Public capital is a non-rival good. 
Equations (24) and (25) represent the market clearing conditions. The first equation describes the 
equilibrium in the importable good market, which shows that the current account (CA) balance 
must  be  compensated  by  the  capital  account  balance.  The  second  equation  is  the  typical 
equilibrium condition in the non-tradable good market. 
t t t t t t m t m t xa t xa t xm t xm t xh t xh t t b r I i g c y y q y q y q b b CA ~ ) ( , , , , , , , , 1               (24) 
and 
t n t n t n t n c p y p , , , ,    (25) 
3.1.6 Competitive Equilibrium 
A competitive equilibrium is a set of allocation rules cm=Cm(s), cn=Cn(s), k₊₁=K(s), b₊₁=B(s), k₊₁∗=K∗(s), 
kxh+1=Kxh(s), kxm+1=Kxm(s), kxa,+1=Kxa(s), km,+1=Km(s), kn,+1=Kn(s); a set of pricing functions r=R(s), and 
pn=Pn(s); and the laws of motion of the exogenous state variables s₊₁=S(s), such that: 
  Households solve the problem (4) taking as given s and the form of the functions R(s), 
Pn(s), and S(s), with the equilibrium solution to this problem satisfying cm=Cm(s), cn=Cn(s), 
k₊₁=K(s), and b₊₁=B(s). 
  Firms  of  the  hydrocarbons,  mining,  agriculture,  importable  and  non-tradable  sectors 
maximize profits (13)-(17) taking as given s and the form of the functions R(s), Pn(s), and 
S(s), with the equilibrium solutions to these problems satisfying kxh,+1=Kxh(s), kxm,+1=Kxm(s), 
kxa,+1=Kxa(s), km,+1=Km(s), kn,+1=Kn(s). 
  The economy-wide resource constraints (24) and (25) hold each period, and the factor 
market clears: 
Kxh(s)+ Kxm(s)+Kxa(s)+Km(s)+Kn(s)=K(s) -15- 
 
3.2 FUNCTIONAL FORMS AND CALIBRATION 
The model which is clearly non-linear, is difficult to solve analytically. The alternative is to use 
numerical methods. Therefore, we adopt functional forms for the utility and productions functions 
and give values to the parameters of the model to match the Bolivian macroeconomic context in 
year 2006. 
 
3.2.1 Functional Forms 
The generic model presented above suggests the following functional form for preferences: 
) ln( ) ln( ) , , ( , , , , t n n t t m m t t n t m c g c g c c u        
with θm, θn>0 and  θm+θn=1. The parameter  measures how a typical individual values public 
consumption relatively to private consumption. The specification for the relationship between 
private  consumption  of  importables  and  public  consumption  follows  Aschauer  (1985),  Barro 
(1981) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). We are assuming that consumption of public goods 
can be perfectly substituted (depending on the value of ) with consumption of importable goods, 
but not with consumption of non-tradable goods. In this way we want to incorporate into the 
model, the fact that the government is increasing its involvement in production activities.
11   
For the production functions we employ the following specification: 
i i
t t i t i t t i t i k k z k k z f




, ,   
where αi is the compensation for capital as a share of output of sector i=xh, xm, xa, m and n and φi 
is  the  coefficient  of  public  capital  in  the  production  function  that  reflects  the  importance  of 
infrastructure in each of the different five sectors of the economy.  
The productivity shocks zi follow standard AR(1) processes of the form: 
1 , , 1 , ) 1 (       t i t i i i t i v z z z     ) , 0 ( ~
2
1 , i t i N v    
3.2.2 Calibration 
Once the laws of motion are specified, we accurately calibrate the model so that it can display the 
main characteristics of the Bolivian economy. We are considering 2006 as our base year and the 
data used is quarterly. In table 3, we display the parameters of the model, which we assume, for 
now, that are invariant to changes in economic policies. 
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 In the last years many public firms have been created to provide manufacturing goods at subsidized prices. 
They produce rice, flour, cardboard, among other products.  -16- 
 
The first column of table 3 shows the deep parameters of preferences. The subjective discount 
factor β was set to make it consistent with a 10.66 percent annual rate at which Bolivians can 
borrow (r ~  in our model). The parameters θm and θn are calibrated so as to reproduce the share of 
total consumption over GDP in steady state, where we define total consumption as consumption 
in  importables  plus  consumption  in  non-tradables  times  its  relative  price.  We  set  =0.5  as  a 
benchmark, implying there is imperfect substitution between private and public consumption.   
 
 
Table 3: Parameters 
Preferences  Prod. Functions  Technology Shocks  Fiscal Variables  Exogenous Prices 
β=0.975  =0.04 (yearly)  xh=0.9  g=0.21  qxh=0.174 
m=0.4585  αxh=0.66  xm=0.9  g=0.2401  qxm=0.14 
n=0.5415  αxm=0.25  xa=0.9  g=0.0531  qxa=0.2 
=0.5  αxa=0.19  m=0.9  g=2*  qxh=0.9965 
  αm=0.58  n=0.9  =0.613  qxm=0.9884 
  αn=0.38  xh=0.01  m=0.1  qxa=0.93 
  xh=0.25  xm=0.01  c=0.13  qxh=0.0623 
  xm=0.14  xa=0.01  k=0.13  qxm=0.07 
  xa=0.12  m=0.01  =0.25  qxa=0.13 
  m=0.07  n=0.01    =0.248 
  n=0.25  zxh=0.43    r=0.6576 
    zxm=0.83    r=0.01146 
    zxa=0.64    r
*=0.048 
    zm=0.165    =1.2 
    zn=0.7     
  Source: Author’s calculations 
The second column describes the deep parameters of the production functions. The depreciation 
rate of private capital δ has been set to 4 percent per year. The output-factor elasticities α in each 
sector were obtained in the following manner: We have reduced the 35 sectors that represent the 
Bolivian  economy  in  the  2006  input-output  matrix,  to  6  sectors  that  represent  agriculture, 
hydrocarbons,  mining,  importables,  non-tradables  and  infrastructure.  In  particular,  we  are 
considering as infrastructure sectors: i) energy, gas and water, ii) transport and storage and iii) 
communications. Then, we have used the value-added decomposition in factor payments for 1996 
(the only year available) and imputed these shares for our sectoral value-added of 2006. The 
corresponding calculations are shown in table A.1 of the appendix. 
Key parameters are the infrastructure shares in each sector. We have used also our input-output 
matrix disaggregation, but here we employed the intermediate consumption of infrastructure in 
each of the five sectors of the model. In other words, we have calculated the ’s as the share of 
intermediate consumption of infrastructure in agriculture, mining, hydrocarbons, importables and -17- 
 
non-tradables. Recall that public capital is conceived as a free good in the model, therefore it 
seems strange to calibrate the share parameters of each sector using intermediate consumption 
which is expenditure. We have solved this concern by assuming that the government is giving 
subsidies to the private sector in order to produce the public goods. Although the government is 
providing the public capital, it is being produced by the private sector and in some manner its 
usage is being also paid by the firms. The corresponding calculations are shown in table A.2 of the 
appendix.
12 
The third column contains the TFP parameters. These parameters have been calibrated to match 
as close as possible the share of output of each sector over GDP. The autorregresive coefficients 
and volatilities of the shocks were set as in Chumacero et.al. (2004).
13 
The forth column shows the government parameters and fiscal variables. The parameters of the 
government  expenditure  AR(1)  process  h ave  been  obtained  by  performing  a   simple  OLS 
regression,  but  the  parameter  g  has  been  calibrated  in  order  to  match  the  government 
expenditure over GDP. The rate of depreciation of public capital δg has been estimated by the 
World Bank to be about twice as high as the rate of depreciation of private capital. The benchmark 
effectiveness parameter θ is estimated here based on data of the so called "Loss Indicators." In 
particular  we  have  employed  loss  indicators  of  power,  telecom,  roads  and  water.  Then,  the 
Bolivian  loss  index  across  infrastructure  types  is  calculated  by  taking  a  weighted  loss  and 
comparing it with the weighted average of industrialized countries. The calculations are shown in 
table A.3 of the appendix. According to these calculations, Bolivia has a level of effectiveness of 
61.3 which means that infrastructure in Bolivia is 39 percent less effective than in the developing 
countries.
14 
The tax rates describe the Bolivian tax system.  The consumption tax τc is approximated by the 
Value  Added  tax  (IVA)  which  is  13%.  The  tax  on  capital  income  τk  corresponds  to  the 
Complementary Regime Value Added tax (RC-IVA) which has also a rate of 13%. The tax on profits 
τ has a rate of 25%. Finally, the import tariff τm represents the average tariff for all the imported 
products; it has a value of 10%. 
Finally  in  column  5  of  table  3  we  display  the  so  called  exogenous  prices.  All  of  them  follow 
standard laws of motion and most of their parameters were estimated using OLS regressions. We 
calibrated  the  constant  terms  of  the  AR(1)  specifications  of  these  relative  prices  using  the 
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, ,  where x represents private intermediate consumption  
13
 This should be set to match the autocorrelation of output and to adjust the speed of convergence to the 
steady state. 
14 We use the same weights as in Rioja (2003), this me ans 0.40, 0.10, 0.25, 0.25 for power, telecom, paved 
roads and water systems respectively. In developing countries the effectiveness index θ is normalized to 1, 
which means that infrastructure is highly effective. -18- 
 
respective index prices calculated by the Bolivian Central Bank. Finally, we calibrated  equal to 
0.248 to match a ratio of external debt over GDP equal to 0.3790, which is consistent with the 
capital account balance in steady state. This value for  combined with a value of  equal to 1.2 
(arbitrary) gives a country risk value equal to 0.05857. 
4. RESULTS 
In this section we perform different simulations with key parameters of the model to quantify the 
effects of fiscal policy on several macroeconomic variables like output, consumption, investment, 
among others. We distinguish the long run effects from the short run dynamics. The long run 
effects are obtained by comparing the steady states of the model under the baseline scenario and 
under  the  simulations  scenario.  The  short  run  dynamic  effects  require  that  we  impose  initial 
conditions, solve the model (find the policy functions of the control variables and the laws of 
motion of the endogenous state variables), and characterize the transition to the new steady 
state. 
According to our specification, the policy functions of the control variables cannot be obtained 
analytically and we have to resort to numerical methods. We use a second-order approximation to 
the policy function. This perturbation method has been proven superior to the traditional linear-
quadratic approximations.
15 
In addition, we have divided the analysis of the results in two groups. The first group is formed by 
all the fiscal policy variables that we have in the model. The second group is composed by non -
fiscal policy variables, like TFP, Country Risk, commodity prices and individual valuation of public 
consumption. In both cases we pay attention to the effects on output and welfare. 
According to the structure of the model, we analyze the effects of fiscal policy variables by: 
  Reducing and increasing the import tariff. According to the Customs Office, the average 
tariff in Bolivia in 2006 was more or less 10 percent. We simulate a hundred percent 
increase and decrease. A 0 percent tariff can be interpreted as a fully opened economy, 
while a 20 percent tariff can be translated into a less world linked economy. 
  Increasing  the  value  added  tax.  Bolivia's  value  added  tax  is  13  percent.  According  to 
Otalora (2009) Bolivia's value added tax is close to the average in Latin America which is 
14.05 percent. The countries with the highest value added tax are Argentina and Mexico 
with a tax of 21 percent, while the country with the lowest tax is Paraguay with 5 percent 
only. We simulate the case where Bolivia changes its tax up to the Latin America average. 
  Decreasing and increasing the capital tax. We are proxying the capital tax by the RC_IVA. 
We simulate a 10 percent increase and decrease of this tax. 
                                                             
15
 We used the same Matlab codes developed by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004). -19- 
 
  Increasing  government  expenditures.  In  our  setting,  public  consumption  includes 
everything that is not investment; this means that health and education expenditure is 
considered in this variable among other expenditures like wages and benefits for public 
workers. In the last two years (2007 and 2008) public expenditure increased on average by 
33 percent. This is the change that we simulate in the model. 
  Increasing public investment in infrastructure as a share of total government revenues.  
We simulate an increase of this share equal to the average of years 2007and 2008. 
  Increasing  the  infrastructure  effectiveness  index.  Rioja  (2003)  shows  that  raising 
effectiveness has sizable positive effects on private investment, consumption and welfare. 
Following this paper, we simulate an increase in the level of effectiveness of the existing 
infrastructure  network  from  0.613  to  0.74.  The  value  of  θ=0.74  is  the  value  of 
effectiveness computed by Rioja (2003) for seven Latin American countries.  
Table 4 resumes the change in parameter values for all the fiscal variables described above. 
Table 4: Values of the Parameters (Fiscal Policy Variables) 
Base Scenario  Simulation Scenario 
Import Tariff 
m=0.1  m=0; m=0.2 
Value Added Tax 
c=0.13  cm=0.1405 
Capital Tax 
k=0.13  cn=0.117 
k=0.13  cn=0.143 
Profits Tax 
=0.25  = 
Government Expenditure 
g =0.21  g =0.2793 
Public Investment Share 
I/Ig=0.2669  I/Ig=0.2756 
Infrastructure Effectiveness Index 
=0.613  =0.74 
        Source: Authors’ calculations 
We simulate the effects of the non-fiscal policy variables by: 
  Increasing TFP in all sectors. According to the National Development Plan (PND for its 
initials in Spanish) in the period 2006-2011, Bolivia should have reached an average annual 
growth in output of 6.3 percent. To attain this overall rate of growth, the sectors should 
have grown (annually) by 3.1 percent (agriculture), 6.8 percent (importables), 18.8 percent -20- 
 
(non-tradables),  13.2  percent  (hydrocarbons)  and  10.4  percent  (mining).  We  have  re-
calibrated the TFP parameters in each sector in order to attain these rates of growth in 
each of the sectors. But, recall that we have calibrated the TFP parameters for quarterly 
rates of growth
16 
  Increasing country risk. Country risk is the risk of an economic investment due to specific 
factors common to a certain country. The country risk is related to the possibility that a 
sovereign state is unable or incapable of fulfilling its obligations to a foreign agent, for 
reasons beyond the usual risks that arise from any credit relationship. We simulate a 2 
percent increases in country risk due to political instability. 
  Change in relative prices (qxh, qxa and qxm). The Bolivian Central Bank has computed these 
relative prices for the basic exportable products of Bolivia. According to these calculations, 
we  simulate  a  26.5  percent  decrease  in  the  relative  price  of  minerals,  a  1.6  percent 
increase in  the  relative  price  of  agricultural  goods and  a  15.8  percent increase in  the 
relative price of hydrocarbons. These changes represent the change in prices between 
2006 and the last two years. 
  Change in public consumption valuation. Public consumption is related to importable's 
consumption by the parameter μ. We simulate an increase in μ to 1 which represents a 
situation where consumers weight public and private consumption equally and a decrease 
in μ to 0, where public consumption is pure waste. 
Table 5: Values of the Parameters (Non-fiscal Policy Variables) 
Base Scenario  Simulation Scenario 
Productivity Changes 
zm=0.165  zm=0.16601 
zn=0.7  zn=0.7308 
zxh=0.43  zxh=0.43332 
zxm=0.83  zxm=0.84486 
zxa=0.64  zxa=0.6439 





174 . 0  xh q   2017 . 0  xh q  
14 . 0  xm q   1029 . 0  xm q  
2 . 0  xa q   2032 . 0  xa q  
Valuation of Public Consumption 
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 The PND expresses the economic and planning strategy that the government will follow in the next years 
to consolidate the process of transformation of the economy. -21- 
 
=0.5  =0; =1 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
4.1 LONG RUN EFFECTS 
Table 6 displays the long run effects results of the fiscal policy variables change. The table shows 
the percentage change in the variables of interest: consumption of each good (cm, cn), physical 
production  in  each  sector  (Yxh,  Yxa,  Yxm,  Ym,  Yn),  profits  in  the  hydrocarbons  sector  (πxh),  the 
reciprocal of the exchange rate (pn), government lump sum transfers as a fraction of output (, as 
a  proxy  for  additional  pressures  on  the  government  budget),  private  investment  (i),  public 
investment (I), total real consumption (C), total real output (Y) and welfare compensation (TU).
17 
 
Table 6: Change in Steady State Values of Fiscal Policy Variables (in percentages) 
Variables  m  m  c  k  k  g   I/ITG    TFP, g   , I/ITG 
cm  8.11  -6.66  -1.41  2.76  -2.76  -14.76  0.8  12.3  -11.33  13.32 
cn  2.33  -2.11  -0.47  1.58  -1.6  -3.99  1.34  11.84  2.18  13.42 
Yxh  19.81  -15.54  -0.81  3.38  -3.37  -4.73  3.26  24.81  -0.23  28.99 
Yxa  2.16  -2.02  -0.03  0.44  -0.46  -0.97  0.64  4.56  0.25  5.25 
Yxm  3.12  -2.85  -0.05  0.62  -0.63  -1.22  0.82  5.79  1.76  6.68 
Ym  -0.10  0  -1.06  2.18  -2.16  -1.09  0.72  5.14  0.89  5.93 
Yn  2.33  -2.11  -0.47  1.58  -1.60  -3.99  1.34  11.84  2.18  13.42 
xh  19.88  -15.49  -0.74  3.44  -3.31  -4.68  3.32  24.79  -0.17  29.07 
pn  -5.23  5.35  -0.7  0.68  -0.68  -2.27  -0.68  -1.57  -5.43  -2.19 
/GDP  -2.63  1.10  3.44  -0.95  0.95  -36.47  -1.10  11.06  -32.57  10.02 
Ip  8.73  -6.50  -1.86  3.83  -3.77  -3.36  1.20  10.21  -0.70  11.75 
Ig  -0.53  0  1.36  0.65  -0.65  -6.38  4.50  12.0  -3.31  17.17 
C  4.57  -3.87  -0.83  2.03  -2.05  -8.16  1.13  12.02  -3.05  13.39 
Y  3.85  -3.21  -0.64  1.85  -1.86  -2.74  1.30  10.41  1.28  11.96 
TU  4.12  -3.80  -0.77  1.85  -1.94  -5.26  1.02  9.94  -0.40  10.93 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
The first and second columns show the change in the import tariff. The first column represents a 
fully opened economy that promotes consumption of importables. Therefore this consumption 
increases by 8.11 percent and aggregate output increases by 4.57 percent. The reduction in the 
price  of  the  capital  good  (importable)  raises  the  value  of  the  marginal  productivity  in  the 
exportable and non-tradable sectors, while keeping it constant in the importable sector. Therefore 
Yxh, Yxa, Yxm and Yn increase and Ym decreases by -0.1 percent. Total real output (at constant prices) 
increases by 3.85 percent and welfare rises by 4.12 percent. Consistent with the tariff reduction, 
                                                             
17 To abstract from changes in relative prices, total consumption (C) and total output (Y) are measured at the 
initial baseline prices. TU is defined as the subsidy (tax if negative) in terms of consumption of importables, 
non tradables and public services that would be needed to compensate (take from) the consumer in order for 
him to be indifferent between the situation before and after the change is made. 
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the real exchange rate depreciates. The opposite effects occur when we increase the import tariff 
(second column), real output decreases by -3.21 percent and real consumption decreases by -3.87 
percent. Notice also that private investment experiences an important increase in a fully opened 
economy, while it decreases by -6.5 percent in a closer economy. Public investment decreases by -
0.53 percent in a fully opened economy, while it remains constant when tariffs increase. Notice 
that although profits in the hydrocarbons sector increase by almost 20 percent in a fully opened 
economy, this increase does not compensate income reduction of the government ant so transfers 
and also public investment shrink.  
A change in the value added tax (third column), ceteris paribus, from 13 percent to 14.05 percent 
reduces all the variables except government transfers which increase by 3.44 percent and public 
investment which increases by 1.36 percent. Despite the endogenous increase in the lump sum 
transfer, the net welfare effect is negative (-0.77 percent) as well as the output effect (-0.64 
percent). Many policymakers think that an increase in the value added tax is the best option to 
sustain the transfers and public investment policies, and looking at these variables only it can be 
true. However, the general equilibrium effects show that the overall effect for the economy is 
adverse.  
The literature on optimal fiscal policy states that capital taxes should be zero in an optimal setting. 
It can be seen that a reduction in capital tax promotes aggregate capital accumulation and this 
increases the amount of capital used in each sector, and thus output in each sector. The sector 
that most benefits from a reduction in capital tax is the hydrocarbon sector, its output increases 
by 3.38 percent. Certainly, this happens because the hydrocarbon sector is intensive in capital ( 
larger than 0.5). The other sector that is intensive in capital which is manufacturing (importables) 
grows by 2.18 percent. Notice that the effects of an increase or a decrease in capital tax are almost 
linear. When capital tax increases by 10 percent, aggregate output decreases by -1.86 percent 
while it increases by 1.85 percent when capital tax decreases by 10 percent.
18 
People  always  expect  to  find  a  positive  effect  on  output  from  an  increase  in  government 
expenditures or public investment. Cross-country empirical studies have generally found that 
public infrastructure has positive effects on a country's productive performance (e.g, Easterly and 
Rebelo (1993), Canning and Fay (1993), Canning (1999)) and this is indeed the case of Bolivia. An 
increase in public investment as a share of government revenues by 3.2 percent (average of the 
last  two  years)  increases  output  by  1.3  percent.  However,  the  opposite  happens  when  the 
government  increases  its  current  expenditures.  An  increase  by  33  percent  of  government 
expenditures  decreases  output  by  -2.74  percent.  Certainly,  an  increase  in  government 
expenditures represents an important pressure for fiscal balance, since transfers as a share of GDP 
have to be reduced by -36.74 percent. This huge reduction explains the negative effects on output, 
consumption and welfare. 
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In the last two columns of table 6 we have performed two combined exercises to infer what other 
conditions should go along with an expansive fiscal policy, so that the Bolivian economy can enjoy 
an increase in output and welfare in the long run. First we combine an increase in government 
expenditures with an increase in TFP in all sectors (both increases are in the same magnitude as 
described in tables 4 and 5). The results show that now an expansive fiscal policy based in current 
expenditure can increase output by 1.28 percent, but still welfare is deprived by -0.4 percent, 
because transfers are still highly and negatively affected and this affects consumption negatively. 
Notice that consumption of importables decreases by -11.33 percent. It is remarkable the trade-
off between government expenditures and transfers. In other words, there is an important trade-
off that has to be considered between increasing public expenditures in education, health and 
other issues and sustaining a social policy based on transfers to households. 
Important and sizable effects but in a smaller magnitude can be seen in the last column where we 
combine an increase in public investment with an increase in the effectiveness parameter θ. Total 
real output increases by 11.96 percent, welfare gains are in the order of 10.93 percent and total 
real consumption rises by 13.39 percent. Lump sum transfers also increase by 10 percent, because 
one of the sources of financing which are hydrocarbons’ profits increases by almost 30 percent. 
This result shows the importance of public investment, but accompanied with effectiveness as 
stressed by Rioja (2003). Looking at the column where we simulate an increase in  alone, it is 
noteworthy the increase in all variables and in particular in sectoral outputs.
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Table 7: Change in Steady State Values of Non-fiscal Policy Variables (in percentages) 
Variables  TFP  CR  qxm  qxa  qxh     
cm  3.44  -0.24  -8.68  0.53  29.01  1.18  -1.41 
cn  6.31  -0.11  -4.63  0.29  16.23  -8.83  8.18 
Yxh  4.58  -0.11  -5.52  0.35  63.26  -6.21  5.94 
Yxa  1.20  -0.03  -1.15  0.44  4.18  -1.29  1.16 
Yxm  2.98  -0.02  -11.04  0.10  5.31  -1.61  1.48 
Ym  1.98  -0.02  -1.27  0.08  4.73  -1.44  1.32 
Yn  6.31  -0.11  -4.63  0.29  16.23  -8.83  8.18 
xh  4.65  -0.05  -5.47  0.40  89.26  18.56  6.01 
pn  -3.27  -0.08  -2.59  0.16  6.51  -8.95  7.97 
/GDP  2.89  -0.12  -7.47  0.44  28.28  -7.47  6.15 
I  2.77  -0.06  -5.16  0.29  26.10  -7.37  7.19 
I  3.12  -0.12  -7.39  0.47  31.97  -8.33  8.22 
C  5.19  -0.16  -6.20  0.38  21.18  -4.96  4.47 
Y  4.09  -0.07  -5.53  0.35  20.32  -5.07  4.71 
TU  4.48  -0.15  -6.13  0.36  16.42  -14.5  10.76 
    Source: Authors’ calculations 
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 We might be overestimating the increase in effectiveness of public capital. In fact we are considering a 20 
percent increase in effectiveness. -24- 
 
Table 7 shows the change in steady state values for the changes in non-fiscal policy parameter 
values. The largest positive effect in this exercise comes, as expected, from TFP. The favorable 
productivity  boost  raises  output  in  all  sectors,  with  a  positive  effect  on  real  income,  real 
consumption,  lump  sum  transfers  and  welfare.  The  real  exchange  rate  depreciates  by  -3.27 
percent. The new literature on growth emphasizes that a sustainable growth can be reached only 
through productivity boosts. Moreover, those Latin American countries that have experienced an 
increase in TFP are the ones that have been able to reduce their growth gap with developing 
countries like the US or UK. Our model demonstrates that this could be the Bolivian case also, if 
the country begins to dismantle all the restrictions and distortions that impede a productivity 
expansion. But, it is not only TFP that could promote the development of the country, because 
certainly an output increase of 4 percent in the long run is still not sufficient to reduce poverty. 
Therefore, we can state that there is room for government policies based on public investment in 
infrastructure, but with effectiveness. This combination will certainly help in reducing poverty and 
the  economic  sectors  will  grow  in  an  important  magnitude  solving  also  other  problems  like 
unemployment and reduced usage of installed capacity.
20 
In  contrast  to  what  we  expected,  an  increase  in  the  country  risk  prem ium  due  to  political 
instability, for example, would have negative but small effects on output and welfare, and in most 
sectors the effect would be negligible. Certainly, private and public investment will suffer from a 
higher  country  risk  premium,  private   investment  will  decrease  by  -0.06  percent  and  public 
investment will decrease by -0.12 percent. 
The result of the exercises with commodity prices (relative prices) show that Bolivia is typically a 
mining country and the mining sector is one of the sectors   that most  contribute to GDP. A 
decrease  in  mineral  prices,  in  international  markets,  by  -26.5  percent  impacts  strongly  the 
economy. Real output declines by -5.53 percent and real consumption decreases by -6.2 percent. 
The production in mining decreases by -11 percent and there is a contagion effect to all the other 
sectors.  In sum, all the variables in the third column have negative signs,  showing the large 
dependence that the Bolivian economy has on natural resources like minerals. 
For agriculture we are simulating a low increase in its relative price (1.6 percent). Therefore the 
effects on macroeconomic and sectoral output are low also, but positive. Aggregate output rises 
by 0.35 percent and output in the agriculture sector rises by 0.44 percent. There is also an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate equal to 0.16 percent.  
After TFP, the relative price of hydrocarbons is the second variable of which a change in its value 
can have a remarkable impact in the Bolivian economy. In part this is explained by the fact that the 
hydrocarbons sector is the main exportable sector in the economy and as it is a  nationalized 
sector, its profits represent an important source of income for the government. For instance, this 
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can  be  seen  by  the  fact  that  an  increase  in  xh q allows  the  government  to  augment  public 
investment as a share of government income by 31.97 percent and also increment the lump sum 
transfers to households by 28.28 percent. Notice also that profits in the hydrocarbons sector rises 
by almost 90 percent. It is noteworthy also that private investment increases by 26.10 percent. 
This occurs because the economy is being able to accumulate more capital in its sector which is 
precisely intensive in capital.
21 
Finally,  we  modify  the  value  of  the  parameter  μ.  Cavalcanti  and  Goncalvez  (2006)  perform  a 
sensitivity analysis and find that there is no problem to use values for μ between 0 and 1, although 
Evans and Karras (1996) have estimated a value of μ equal to 1.14 using a GMM estimator. We 
observe that when public consumption is pure waste (μ=0) people substitute it with consumption 
of importables (cm increases by 1.18 percent), but when both consumptions are equally valued by 
the people, people consume less importables (cm decreases by -1.41 percent). It is interesting to 
observe also that when public consumption is equally valued to private consumption, the welfare 
gains are sizable, and this happens because we are considering that public consumption is part of 
the utility function. Recall again that in public consumption we are considering the government 
expenditures in health and education. So another way to interpret this last results is that if human 
capital were more prized in Bolivia (through health and education), the economy would benefit 
from higher output (aggregate and sectoral) and welfare. Other key macroeconomic variables like 
consumption and investment (private and public) will also improve.
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4.2 IMPACT AND DYNAMIC TRANSITION EFFECTS 
In the long run, we model fiscal policy and non-fiscal policy variations as permanent changes in the 
levels  of  tax  rates  levied  on  different  sectors  or  as  multiplicative  shocks  on  their  production 
functions.  Thus,  to  quantify  the  long  run  level  effects  of  these  policies  we  concentrated  on 
comparisons between two steady states. 
Three issues are overlooked in the long run analysis: First, because of their nature fiscal policy 
produces  gradual  and  not  instantaneous  changes  in  the  macroeconomic  variables.  Second, 
potential costs and benefits of policy changes have to be evaluated considering the period in 
which  they  go  into  effect  (initial  conditions  are  very  different  from  steady-state  conditions). 
Finally, the structure of the economy determinates the speed of convergence to the new steady 
state and the transitional dynamics. 
Let s0 be the values of the state variables in the initial period (that we calibrated to replicate the 
Bolivian economy in the year 2006). Let Gi (⋅) be the policy functions of the control variables and 
Si(⋅) the implied laws of motion of the state variables for scenarios i=B,C1,C2,C3 and C4. B is the 
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 This can explain also the extremely favorable conditions that the Bolivian economy has enjoyed in the last 
years. The international economic crisis has not affected either the Bolivian economy. 
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  Perhaps  a  better  specification  of  the  utility  function  would  be  to  consider  public  consumption  as  a 
substitute of non-tradable’s consumption rather than importable’s consumption.  -26- 
 
base  scenario.  C1  is  the  combined  scenario  1  that  combines  an  increase  in  government 
expenditures and an increase in TFP for all sectors. C2 is the combined scenario 2 than combines 
an increase in public investment as a percentage of government incomes and an increase in θ. 
Scenario C3 is the combined scenario 1 plus an increase in the relative price of hydrocarbons in a 
magnitude  exactly  to  offset  the  decrease  in  the  lump  sum  transfers  to  households.  Finally, 
scenario C4 encompasses scenario 2 with a reduction in the relative price of hydrocarbons exactly 
to maintain the transfers unaltered. These last exercises aim to analyze the needed increase or the 
feasible decrease in the price of hydrocarbons, in order to apply an expansive fiscal policy, but 
without  having  to  reduce  transfers  to  households,  which  is  the  actual  social  policy  that  the 
government is using to attack poverty.
23 
Using  the  policy  functions,  laws  of  motion,   and  initial  conditions  in  all  scenarios,  dynamic 
simulations are carried out for all variables of interest. Then, we compare the dynamic trajectories 
of each variable under any with those of scenario B. 
4.2.1 Impact on Macroeconomic Variables 
Table 8 reports the impact and dynamic-transition effects for Bolivia under the four fiscal policy 
scenarios for the main macroeconomic variables. In the table we report the effects at quarter four 
(equivalent to a one year effect, i.e. 2007), at quarter 20 (equivalent to a five year effect, i.e. 2011) 
and at quarter 40 (equivalent to a ten year effect, i.e. 2016). As a result of the persistence of policy 
changes, productivity shocks, changes in the effectiveness of infrastructure, combined with the 
discrepancies  between  initial  conditions  and  steady-state  conditions,  the  economy  converges 
slowly to its steady-state equilibrium. In figure A.1 in the appendix we show the corresponding 
graphs for each scenario where it is clearly seen the slow convergence to the new steady state 
variation.
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Table 8: Transition in Macroeconomic Variables (% points, quarters after change) 
Scenario  C1  C2  C3  C4 
Quarter  4  20  40  4  20  40  4  20  40  4  20  40 
pn  -3.2  -5.2  -5.5  -3.4  -3.2  -3.1  -3.3  -5.2  -5.3  -3.3  -3.2  -3.2 
cm  -10.5  -10.6  -10.6  1.2  2.6  4.1  -10.6  -10.6  -10.2  1.3  2.6  3.9 
cn  0.5  2.6  2.9  4.5  5.5  6.6  0.5  2.6  3.1  4.5  5.5  6.6 
Y  2.2  2.0  1.9  3.7  4.7  5.7  2.2  2.3  2.5  3.7  4.5  5.4 
C  -3.7  -2.5  -2.3  3.2  4.4  5.6  -3.8  -2.5  -2.1  3.3  4.4  5.5 
I  -2.7  -2.6  -2.7  6.8  7.9  9.2  -1.1  -0.6  0.0  6.2  7.2  8.1 
Source: Author’s calculation based on PEP 1-1 model 
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24  The  consistency  of  the  results  was  checked  by  simulating  the  transition  for  up  to  2000  periods  and 
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The impact effects of scenario C1 reflect a decreasing expansion of output as a result of the 
increased government expenditures. Consumption decreases by -3.7 percent in the first year and 
it  decreases  by  -2.3  percent  in  10  years.  However  it  reaches  its  steady-state  level  after  100 
quarters. Notice that the reduction of consumption is mainly driven by a reduction in cm. In fact, 
consumption of non-tradables increases by 2.9 percent in 10 years. The exchange rate depreciates 
by 5.2 percent after 5 years and by 5.5 percent after 10 years (almost its steady-state value).  
Public investment (last row of table 8) converges also slowly to its steady-state value. After 40 
quarters  it  has  decreased  by  -2.7  percent  and  after  300  quarters  it  reaches  its  steady  state 
decrease of -3.3 percent. All these effects can be better appreciated in figure A.1 of the appendix. 
Under scenario C2, the effects are smoother than under scenario C1 and all variables reach their 
steady-state variations simultaneously (around quarter 600. It is important to mention that all 
variables displayed on the table are far from their steady-state after 10 years. This is not the case 
under  scenario  C1.  For  instance,  output  increases  by  5.7  percent  after  40  quarters,  while  it 
increases by 11.9 percent after 700 quarters. Public investment increases by 6.8 percent after one 
year and it increases by 9.2 percent after 10 years, but again it is far from its steady-state variation 
which is 17.1 percent.  
Next, we combine the exercise performed in scenario 1 with an increase in the relative price of 
hydrocarbons, exactly to offset the decrease in lump sum transfers to households. The results 
show that if relative prices of hydrocarbons increase by 14.74 percent, transfers as a percentage of 
output will remain constant in the long run. The transitional dynamics are also different in scenario 
C3 than in scenario C1, in particular if we look at the effects on output, consumption and public 
investment. Although, in the short and medium run, there is a decrease in consumption and public 
investment, both variables end up increasing by 13.3 percent and 21.4 percent after 700 quarters 
respectively (see figure in the appendix). In the table it is shown that investment does not change 
after 40 years, but then it starts to increase. It is noteworthy to see also that real exchange rate 
depreciates in the short run, but then this depreciation rate reverses and the economy converges 
in  the  long-run  to  an  appreciation  of  0.5  percent.  The  same  happens  with  consumption  of 
importables, it decreases by -10.2 percent after 40 quarters, but then it increases by 10.6 percent 
after 700 quarters. 
One  explanation  is  that  the  effects  of  an  increase  in  government  expenditures  are  perceived 
immediately and faster than the effects of an increase in the relative price of hydrocarbons. We 
can infer this by observing that the percentage change of pn in scenario C3 after 40 quarters is the 
same of scenario C1 after 40, 700 or even 1500 quarters. The economy delays in perceiving the 
effect of the increase in the relative price of hydrocarbons. Transition is also slow because the 
economy is seeking to recover consumption but also transfers at he same time, without reducing 
investment.  
We can infer also from table 8 and figure A.1 that the transition is longer under a fiscal policy that 
is  accompanied  by  a variation in  the  relative  price of  hydrocarbons.  We  do  not  have  a  clear -28- 
 
explanation for this result, but it seems that as transfers are not being affected, the economy 
takes more time to accommodate to its new steady state. Certainly, behind these results it is likely 
to be the fact that the reactions of the functions are calibrated for a change not so fast (low 
sigmas) 
Finally, we combine scenario 2 with a decrease in the relative price of hydrocarbons (qxh). The 
analysis indicates that if the government wants to maintain its transfer policy unaltered, qxh could 
decrease in 6 percent. In other words, there is a margin of 6 percent for the relative price of 
hydrocarbons that could decrease and the government could maintain its social policy based in 
bonuses. It is a low margin, though. Nevertheless, it is remarkable to see that during the initial 
periods of the transition (before 40 quarters) the change in variables is small. Observe that the 
percentage changes reported in table 8 are very similar under scenario C2 and under scenario C4. 
It is only in figure A.1 in the appendix that we can perceive that in the long run, there are indeed 
large differences between scenarios C2 and C4. Clearly, all variables are depressed under scenario 
C4 than under scenario C2. For instance, the change in output falls from 11.9 percent (C2) to 5.9 
percent (C4) after 700 quarters and consumption declines from 13.4 percent (C2) to 6.3 percent 
(C4) after 1500 quarters.  
4.2.2 Impact on Sectoral Output 
To end this section we have included the transition dynamics for the output in each of the five 
sectors under analysis. Table 9 resumes these results under the same four fiscal policy scenarios 
described above. In general, it can be seen that, if the government wishes to promote output in all 
of  the  sectors,  a  fiscal  policy  based  in  an  expansion  of  public  investment  rather  than  in 
government expenditures is preferred. 
 
Table No. 9: Transition in Sectoral Output (percentage points, quarters after policy changes) 
Scenario  C1  C2  C3  C4 
Quarter  4  20  40  4  20  40  4  20  40  4  20  40 
Yxh  1.8  1.5  1.2  10.7  12.7  15.0  2.1  3.2  4.7  10.5  12.0  13.4 
Yxa  0.7  0.6  0.5  2.4  2.7  3.1  0.7  0.6  0.6  2.4  2.7  3.1 
Yxm  2.1  2.2  2.1  3.0  3.4  3.9  2.1  2.1  2.1  3.0  3.4  3.9 
Ym  1.3  1.2  1.2  0.3  1.0  1.7  1.2  0.8  0.6  0.4  1.1  1.9 
yn  3.4  3.1  2.9  4.5  5.5  6.6  3.3  3.1  3.1  4.5  5.5  6.6 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
In scenarios 1 and 3, we analyze a fiscal policy expansion based on an increase in government 
expenditures. We know that under scenario C1, output in the hydrocarbons sector displays a 
negative change in the long run. However, notice that output in this sector displays a positive 
change in quarter 40. Under scenario C3, hydrocarbon’s output changes by 4.7 percent in quarter 
40 and its change larger than 50 percent are noticeable only after quarter 500 more or less.    
Table 9 also shows that output in the importables (manufacturing) sector displays a similar path 
under scenario C1 and under scenario C3 and also comparing scenarios C2 and C4. But, if we look -29- 
 
at figure A.2 in the appendix we can see that this sector displays different rates of change in the 
long run. The same occurs with the non-tradables. According to table 9, scenarios C2 and C4 are 
exactly the same, but according to figure A.2 there are important differences in the long run. In 
fact, non-tradables output changes by 13.4 percent in scenario C2 and it changes by 8.5 percent in 
scenario C4, after 700 quarters.   
Another interesting result is that in all sectors, output displays positive changes, although these 
changes can be decreasing. For instance, in the agricultural sector, under scenario C1, output 
change declines from 0.7 percent in one year to 0.5 percent in 10 years. This is true also in the long 
run, except for the hydrocarbons sector that we already mentioned that displays negative output’s 
change in the long-run, under scenario C1.  
The transition to the new steady-state, in terms of percentage changes, is again smoother under 
scenario C2 than under scenario C4. Under scenario C2, all variables reach their new steady-state 
variation around quarter 400. Under scenario C4, all variables display a bumpy figure, they jump to 
a highest percentage change and then they start to decrease until they reach their new steady-
state percentage change. In particular, it is striking the hump-shaped figure of the hydrocarbon’s 
output, which indicates again that the reduction in the relative price of hydrocarbons is perceived 
after several periods or turns into effect after several periods. 
Finally, we can conclude form this section that dynamic transitions are slow under expansive fiscal 
policies in the Bolivian economy, and they become slower when there are also accompanied by 
changes in the relative price of hydrocarbons. In addition, the change in the relative price of 
hydrocarbons generates an irregular transition, which can be seen clearly by the hump-shaped 
figures that output displays in all sectors. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Bolivia  has  experienced  in  recent  years  an  important  commodity  price  boom,  which  has 
significantly increased its external revenues. This export boom has allowed the country to reverse 
chronic fiscal and external deficits, and accumulate foreign exchange reserves up to a level never 
seen before (USD 7.7 billion in 2008 and USD 8.5 billion in 2009). In addition in the last four years, 
the Bolivian economy has grown more than in the last three decades, with an average of 5.2 
percent. Moreover, the growth forecasts for 2009 allocate the Bolivian economy with the highest 
rate of growth in the western hemisphere. 
Since 2004 the government revenues has increased almost 20 percentage points of GDP. A large 
proportion of this increase is due to the increase of the revenues from hydrocarbons, and this 
occurred because royalties’ payment increased, the government renationalized the industry and 
the international market experienced highest international oil prices. This unprecedented scenario 
allowed the government to impulse fiscal policy (expenditure and investment policy) and to put in 
place several transfer programs for poor people.  -30- 
 
This paper simulates the macroeconomic and sectoral impact of different fiscal policy scenarios by 
setting up a five-sector dynamic general equilibrium model for a small open economy, inhabited 
by representative infinitely-lived agents that face an upward sloping supply of foreign capital, 
reflecting an endogenous country risk premium. Firms in each sector employ also public capital as 
a factor of production, which allows us to analyze the impact on private production of public 
investment in infrastructure. Public capital displays non-rivalry and only its effective measure is 
useful for private production. The model has been calibrated to match the national account ratios 
and sectoral output of the Bolivian economy for the base year 2006.  
Simulation results for key sectors and aggregate variables are reported for steady state under two 
groups of variables, fiscal variables (taxes, government expenditures and public investment) and 
non fiscal variables (TFP, country risk and relative prices). The results indicate that having a fully 
opened  economy  is  very  beneficial  for  the  economy;  all  variables  experience  an  important 
increase,  while  increasing  the  consumption  tax  (IVA)  is  very  detrimental  although  it  allows 
increasing transfers to households by 3.44 percent. A decrease in the capital tax promotes private 
capital accumulation, private investment increases by 3.83 percent. Production in the hydrocarbon 
sector rises by 3.38 percent because it is a capital intensive sector.  
It is verified that the effectiveness index of public  capital is a very sensible parameter in the 
Bolivian economy. A 20 percent increase in the effectiveness of public capital can raise output by 
10.41 percent and welfare by 9.94 percent. In general all macroeconomic and sectoral variables 
are  strongly  improved  by  an  efficient  provision  of  infrastructure.  It  is  observed  also  that 
government  expenditures  expansive  policies  can  have  negative  effects  even  if  they  are 
accompanied by an increase in productivity. In the combined scenario of TFP changes according to 
the National Development Plan goals with a 33 percent increase in government expenditures, 
output rises by 1.28 percent, but consumption declines by -0.4 percent. 
In  another  combined  scenario  we  combine  an  increase  of  public  investment  as  a  share  of 
government incomes with an increase in the index of effectiveness of public capital. The results 
are sizable, aggregate output boosts by 11.96 percent and welfare by 10.93 percent. Transfers as a 
share of GDP increase by 10 percent and public investment increases by 17.17 percent. These 
results indicate that a fiscal policy based on public investment is preferable to a fiscal policy based 
on government expenditures, because the latter implies a marked trade-off between fiscal policy 
and social policy in Bolivia. 
Recall that Bolivia has renationalized the oil industry; this means that the government actually has 
an additional source of financing which are precisely the profits of the hydrocarbon sector. We 
have  explored  this  issue  by  computing  the  percentage  increase  of  the  relative  price  of 
hydrocarbons needed to off-set the negative effects on transfers of an expansive fiscal policy 
based on current expenditures. The results indicate that prices (of natural gas) should increase by 
14  percent.  This  is  another  advantage  of  a  fiscal  policy  based  on  public  investments  in 
infrastructure; there is a margin in which the relative prices of hydrocarbons can even decrease, -31- 
 
without altering the transfers to households. In our simulations this relative price can decrease by 
6 percent.   
Finally, we simulated the dynamic transition paths of the four combined scenarios to analyze the 
speed of convergence when the economy moves from one steady state (base scenario) to a new 
steady state. The macroeconomic and sectoral results show that the transitions are slow and take 
several years to converge to the new steady state variations. These transitions are even longer and 
display hump-shaped figures when they are accompanied by variations in the relative price of 
hydrocarbons.   
The  paper  has  analyzed  fiscal  policy  in  Bolivia  and  has  tried  to  guide  the  decisions  that  a 
government  will  have  to  make  if  it  wants  to  use  fiscal  policy  as  the  main  tool  to  promote 
development and structural transformations of the Bolivian economy. The results should come as 
no surprise. Productivity is very important to promote an increase in output and welfare, but there 
is also room for fiscal policy, in particular to attain larger increases in output and welfare. The best 
that the government can do is to employ public investment in infrastructure as the main tool to 
promote output and welfare expansions in a magnitude necessary to attack poverty. But, that is 
not the end of the story, public capital or infrastructure should be efficiently provided.  -32- 
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Table A.1: Calibration of  





(6 y 19) 
Mining (7, 
20, 21 y 22) 
Importables 
(8-18 y 23) 
Non-
tradables 







Communications  TOTAL 
 VA (in 
thousands 
of Bs. Of 
1990) 
f-lab  6,444,261  798,415  3,384,730  3,270,488  19,476,173  535,857  4,447,022  120,588  38,477,535 
f-cap  1,873,349  4,834,479  1,295,147  4,440,511  11,971,380  1,579,682  3,220,626  1,324,170  30,539,342 
f-land  1,459,264  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1,459,264 
f-natres  0  1,670,433  511,687  0  0  0  0  0  2,182,120 
total  9,776,874  7,303,326  5,191,564  7,711,000  31,447,553  2,115,539  7,667,648  1,444,758  72,658,262 
in% 
                  f-lab  0.66  0.11  0.65  0.42  0.62  0.25  0.58  0.08  0.53 
f-cap  0.19  0.66  0.25  0.58  0.38  0.75  0.42  0.92  0.42 
f-land  0.15  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02 
f-natres  0.00  0.23  0.10  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03 
total  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Source: Input-output matrix (2006)  
Table A.2: Calibration of  






Mining (7, 20, 
21 y 22) 
Importables 
(8-18 y 23) 
Non-
tradables (25, 
26 y 29-35) 
 Intermediate Consumption 
(thousands of Bs. Of 1990) 
Agriculture  673,280   1,903   16,516   3,633,472   196,011  
Hydrocarbons  37,740   1,171,274   106,898   154,590   187,431  
Mining  31,698   162,272   585,708   574,910   1,022,309  
Importables  528,444   88,162   257,327   2,823,865   2,331,561  
Non-tradables  128,294   369,308   57,827   260,887   1,008,874  
Electricity, gas and wáter  322   52,109   50,813   89,587   169,092  
Transport and storage  186,842   534,921   102,381   403,240   1,161,924  
Communications  1,781   3,935   18,218   66,670   235,227  
Total  1,588,400   2,383,885   1,195,688   8,007,221   6,312,428  
Infrastructure  188,944   590,965   171,412   559,497   1,566,243  
Phis  0.12  0.25  0.14  0.07  0.25 




Table A.3. Calibration of  
Year  Power (i)  Telecom (ii)  Paved Roads (iii)  Water (iv) 
1995  11.56  n.a.  94.50  n.a. 
1996  11.49  n.a.  94.50  n.a. 
1997  11.61  n.a.  94.30  n.a. 
1998  11.99  n.a.  94.00  n.a. 
1999  11.41  n.a.  93.60  n.a. 
2000  10.18  n.a.  93.40  n.a. 
2001  12.40  n.a.  93.30  n.a. 
2002  13.07  n.a.  93.30  n.a. 
2003  14.35  n.a.  93.00  n.a. 
2004  13.61  n.a.  93.00  n.a. 
2005  13.95  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
2006  14.36  n.a.  n.a.  37.03 
2007  n.a.  17.76  n.a.  31.97 
2008  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  32.87 
(i)  Electric power transmission and distribution losses (% of output) 
(ii) Faults (per 100 mainlines per year) 
(iii)  Roads, not paved (% of total roads) 
(iv) Losses (% of total water provision) 
 
Dynamic Transitions 
Figure A.1: Scenarios C1, C2, C3 and C4 – Macroeconomic Impact 
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Source: Authors’ calculations 
Figure A.2: Scenarios C1, C2, C3 and C4 – Sectoral Impact 
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